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Abstract 
Since the end of the Cold War, Europe has never been so peacefully consolidated. However, 
its vulnerability still exists in a context of increasing globalization, where societies are facing 
security threats and challenges that are growing in size and sophistication, as Ukraine 
highlights. To protect freedom, security, human rights, political stability, democracy and 
cultural identity, the EU developed effective tools within which research and innovation can 
play a fundamental role of support to understand, identify, prevent and discourage security 
threats. Horizon 2020 programme section “Secure societies: Protecting freedom and security 
of Europe and Its Citizens” designed to improve border security through conflict prevention 
and peace-building, will contribute to the implementation of Europe 2020 strategy. The aim 
of this paper is to define the advancement degree of the functional change on EU Eastern 
borders and to understand the value and the future geopolitical implications of the relations 
between Ukraine, Russia, EU, and USA. 
Keywords: Ukrainian crisis, Horizon 2020, Eastern borders, Russia, Western Bloc 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the USSR, the European continent has 
never enjoyed such a strengthened state of peace, in which the level of security is very high 
compared to other parts of the world.  
On the other hand, one of the fundamental objectives of the European Union is to create an 
area without internal frontiers in which the citizens can move, live and work freely knowing 
that their rights are fully respected and their security is totally assured. However, the 
vulnerability of Europe continues to exist in a context of increasing globalization, where 
societies are facing security threats and challenges that are growing in scale and 
sophistication.  
What has happened and continues to happen in Ukraine, sets a perfect example of it. A 
real revolution with unmistakable events and traces and a progressive escalation, which 
curiously the media has not given a name yet. Ten years after the Orange Revolution, 
Ukraine has returned to the centre of the interest of the whole world. 
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2. HISTORICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL PRELIMINARY REMARKS ON THE 
UKRAINIAN SITUATION 
 
The last 20 years were a succession of political changes in Ukraine between pro-Russians and 
pro-Europeans. In 2010, Yanukovych, who defeated Tymoshenko by a narrow margin, was 
elected President of the Republic. In 2011, Tymoshenko was investigated in a prosecution for 
embezzlement of public funds, with the accusation that she had signed a contract with the 
Russian company Gazprom for the supply of natural gas which was judged uselessly 
burdensome for the country, in 2012 the Supreme Court of Ukraine, in the last degree of 
judgment, upheld the sentence to seven years in prison for misfeasance. 
In the course of 2013 protests against the pro-Russian president were initiated but 
culminated in December when the government suspended an association agreement between 
Ukraine and the EU, which degenerated during January and February 2014 in fierce and 
violent clashes provoking injuries and deaths, which led to the deposition of President 
Yanukovych and Tymoshenko's release on February 22.  
But the real causes of the current crisis and rebellions can be referred primarily to the 
existence of one State divided into two parts: 
- A pro-Western North-West, where the majority of the population is Ukrainian, Roman 
Catholic or Orthodox faithful to the Patriarchate of Kiev and economically tied to Poland and 
Europe.  
- A pro-Russian South-East, where the majority of the population is Russian or Russian-
speaking, Orthodox faithful to the Patriarchate of Moscow and economically tied to Russia. 
                       
Figure 1. "Results/General results of the census/ National composition of population" 2001 Ukrainian Census.                                  
Retrieved May 20, 2007, elaborated by Kuban Kazak 
  
Therefore, the tense situation started with the change in the leadership of the Government 
of Kiev and arrived even to the plebiscite of the referendum in Crimea in March when the 
final figures demonstrate that 96.6% are in favour of the secession from Kiev and the 
annexation to the Russian Federation, an expected result which assumes further significance 
for the remarkable turnout at the polls (3 out of 4 voted, of a total of over a million and a half 
of those entitled). Besides the exultation of Crimea, Russia seems ready to certify the 
outcome of the vote with the definitive military occupation while all the Western diplomats, 
primarily the EU and the U.S.A., declared the consultations "illegal" because they took place, 
according to the U.S.A., under the threat of violence and intimidation of an intervention by 
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Russian soldiers, and therefore in violation of international law. On one hand, Moscow is 
increasingly isolated as the UN Security Council voted on a resolution for the non-validity of 
the referendum and Russia remained the only one to vote no, since China also refrained. 
However, even Putin seems to be concerned about the tension in the south-eastern regions of 
Ukraine due to the permissiveness of the authorities in Kiev. On the other hand, there is the 
desire of European countries to use diplomatic confrontation and dialogue.  
However, the outcome of the referendum has increased the risk that the gradual, violent 
disintegration of Ukraine would lead to a hard confrontation between Russia and the West, in 
a scenario that brings to mind the Cold War. In fact, it’s true that geopolitical tensions, such 
as the Ukrainian one, threaten international stability for they are not confined locally but 
extended to a geographically, geopolitically and geo-economically global confrontation/clash 
involving Russia, U.S.A. and Europe. Given the domino effect that is occurring, a regional 
crisis at Europe's borders threatens to turn into a further blow to the fragile global economic 
recovery. 
Certainly, there is no danger of a new world war, but one should not underestimate the 
unexpected dynamics triggered by a series of moves and countermoves made by all the 
involved parties. Moreover, the name Ukraine means "border region": a border that today 
separates the spheres of influence of Moscow and Brussels (The toponym Ukraine comes 
from the ancient Eastern Slavic u okraina formed of u ("near, at") and "ocraina" (periphery), 
the Slavic root kraj ("limit", "edge"). Accordingly, ukraina means "at the margin", or "on the 
border"). 
                          
Source: Elizon Map  
Figure 2. Ukraine‘s Political Map. 
 
It is undeniable that the reclamation of Crimea, given by Khrushchev in 1954, was 
definitely desired by Moscow, but it certainly was not in the plans. The Revolution of 
Independence Square in Kiev, where the nationalist anti-Russian right-wing has had a 
significant part, had the effect of awakening the separatism of most Crimeans, of Russian 
language and feelings; it also offered the unexpected opportunity to the Kremlin to transform 
the "desire" into reality. Before the crisis the dismemberment of Ukraine was not in the plans 
of Moscow, but the refusal of Kiev to compromise over-federalization, relations with the EU 
and Eurasian Union, along with the Western hostility led Putin to change objective, using a 
variety of advantageous circumstances: the intolerance of large parts of the Russian-speaking 
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population of eastern and southern Ukraine, the support of the Russian public opinion and the 
Western impotence to oppose an effective deterrent. 
Undoubtedly, the present condition of the country can be fully understood only by 
considering the history and geography of its territory. Important is the recent fact that in order 
to preserve ties with Moscow despite the nationalists’ russophobia, the former Prime Minister 
Yanukovych adopted an ambiguously opportunist attitude: negotiating alternatively with 
Russia and the EU. His fatal mistake, which led to the current crisis, was the use of force 
against peaceful pro-European protesters of the early days which caused the passing of the 
baton to the radical nationalists (Banderovci). The eastern cities that came down to the streets 
against the "fascists of Kiev" demonstrate how the "community" built by the USSR still 
enjoys strong support. The appeal to Russia can be interpreted as a cry for help on behalf of 
the "Slavic brotherhood", a feeling inseparable from pride because of the common passed 
membership in the USSR. In front of the threat of separation from the centre of the East 
Slavic world represented by Moscow, even the Russian Orthodox Church which is active and 
influential in both countries plays an important role. Among other things, pro-European 
regions are in greater economic difficulties compared to those of pro-Russians.  
From a geographical point of view, the preservation of Ukraine in its current borders is not 
doubted in the country, as shown by the fact that Moscow has so far intervened only in 
Crimea, an easily controllable peninsula, unlike other eastern regions. Given the spatial 
concentration of the nationalists and russophiles, Ukraine can be presumably split into two 
more homogeneous states. However, in this perspective, as many have pointed out, the EU 
will find itself having to support a poor region and devoid of industries, furthermore, none of 
the two entities would be actually willing to give up on Kiev. For these reasons, this road 
appears to be accessible only with traumatic and uncontrollable effects. The only option that 
can guarantee long-term stability seems to be a neutral foreign policy; otherwise, new 
revolutions and crises might emerge in the future. To better understand the direction that the 
story of Ukraine will take, it is necessary to wait for the moves of the Kremlin after the 
capture of Crimea and the reaction of the Western-backed provisional government. Surely, 
the responsibility of the current situation can be attributed to all the parts involved. 
3. POSITIONS, RELATIONS AND LIABILITY OF THE GEOPOLITICAL BLOCS 
INVOLVED 
3.1 Western responsibility and effects of the current situation   
The responsibilities of the European Union and the West in general are primarily explicable 
by the vagueness of the eastern border of Europe that should have determined a more careful 
and more detailed policy towards Russia. Given the entry of the Baltic States to NATO 
without any concrete Russian resistance, there was an illusion that the same could happen 
when absorbing a country like Ukraine into the sphere of European influence, moreover, with 
the possibility of becoming a part of the European Union in the future. A Western ingenuity 
in pursuing these objectives, the scope of which has not been compensated by a prearranged 
and serious dialogue aimed to involve Moscow in more intense economic and political 
relations with Europe and, more importantly, highlighting the lack of will to isolate it.  
On the contrary, under the influence of the new EU member States the susceptibility as 
well as the fear of Moscow were ignored, using a critical and sometimes even opinionated 
approach towards Russia. It was predictable and inevitable eventually to be on a collision 
course with the current Putin, who, mindful of the humiliations suffered in the past, seems 
even more determined not only to gain respect, but also to rebuild his control over the "near 
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abroad". In addition, the EU should have been more cautious in pushing Ukraine towards an 
Association Agreement, without being completely sure if the necessary prerequisites existed. 
The fall of Yanucovich proved how unprepared Ukraine was and how unreliable the regime 
was to ensure the necessary respect of the important commitments deriving from the 
agreement. It is, therefore, legitimate for Moscow to suspect that the push towards its 
conclusion was primarily a function of the containment of Russia, which is so prevalent in the 
strategies of the new member states of Central, and Eastern Europe. On top of that, the 
agreement not only opposed Putin’s project of a customs union and the even more ambitious 
one of the Eurasian Union, which Ukraine was part of, but it was configured as an additional 
challenge to Putin's ambitions of revenge. Of course, this does not imply that one party is 
right while the other is wrong, but it means that in foreign policy diplomacy, as well as the 
ability to understand the reasons of the opponent, are useful not only to resolve conflicts but 
also to prevent them.  
The position of the U.S.A. has also aggravated the situation; it is undeniable that Europe 
has greater need to maintain economic relations with Moscow, even if it’s only for energy 
needs. This led, as in the days of the USSR, to a more pragmatic and more cautious approach, 
especially by the countries of old Europe, compared to the one of the United States. However, 
in regards to the fundamental political choices, the line is still drawn by the United States: on 
one hand, the persistent distrust towards the former Russian opponent, on the other the 
tendency to underestimate its role in the international arena, to the point of neglecting its 
interests even on the regional level, such as in Ukraine. 
However, there is a differentiation within the EU. It is known that Germany, along with 
Italy, is one of the main economic partners of Moscow, and in particular for the gas purchase. 
A different situation is the United Kingdom and France, which are less dependent on Russia 
both in terms of energy supplies and trade in general; in fact, they are more aligned with the 
U.S. position, as had happened in regards to Syria. It is an attitude shared by Poland and 
Sweden, traditionally interested in Ukrainian business and very critical towards the Russian 
expansionism. It is not a coincidence that the EU Foreign ministers have not found a common 
line of conduct, in the extraordinary summit of March 3, and so they decided to pass the ball 
to Heads of State. A strong common position of the European Union is not to be expected not 
even from them: in this crisis, as in earlier times (the former Yugoslavia) the United States 
will be the one to decide the policy, while the individual capitals will choose to position 
themselves in relation to Washington, and Brussels will possibly deal with future economic 
negotiations. Moreover, after Lisbon, the EU does not have any foreign policy, and the 
Ukrainian crisis highlighted it transforming itself into an existential crisis for the EU. 
As The Economist points out, effects of the crisis in Ukraine were to reinvigorate 
transatlantic ties, rekindle the love lost between the transatlantic allies, intensify political 
contacts, forcing President Obama to return to the old continent. In fact, the US-EU Summit 
became less frequent under his presidency. Putin has not only rekindled the relationship 
between America and Europe, but also accelerated the divorce of Russia from many former 
Soviet partners. 
3.2. The position of Russia and the liability of Putin’s policy 
Many think that Putin’s threats to the territorial integrity of Ukraine must be absolutely 
rejected. There is no doubt that the intervention of Moscow was not necessary to protect the 
Russian population of Crimea, as there was no threat coming from either Kiev or the western 
regions. In fact, it was not a predetermined operation but well prepared and masterfully 
orchestrated by a Premier with undoubted excellent strategic skills. After studying the moves 
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of the "opponent" all he did was reproduce them (and perhaps induce them) in Crimea: the 
popular protest, taking possession of the power of the institutions, the appointment of a new 
president of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and a new mayor of Sevastopol with a 
controversial procedure. 
Most shocking is the arrogance and impudence with which the Russian propaganda and 
Putin himself, tries to sell his version of the events, denying even the intervention of its 
military, and thus justifying the legitimacy of what is happening. In fact, its illegality is 
evident. According to the Ukrainian constitutional law, the appointment of Aksionov, which 
took place without the agreement of Kiev, in a parliament occupied by armed men, was 
illegal; and so was the referendum, as already mentioned. Even in terms of international law, 
in case Crimea should be separated from Ukraine, there would be a violation of the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine, in defiance of international norms and treaties. At this point, the 
Budapest Memorandum of 1994 should be mentioned in particular, in which in exchange for 
the waiver of Ukraine to the possession of nuclear weapons on its territory, the United States, 
the United Kingdom and the Russian Federal Republic undertook to respect and ensure the 
territorial integrity. 
Politically, Putin justifies his actions by appealing to the way in which the change of 
government happened in Kiev and to the presence of nationalist elements of the extreme right 
in the new government (as if the positions of Moscow were not also inspired by the most 
fervent nationalism). In fact, Putin’s hard-line strengthened even more the intransigent 
nationalist component in Kiev. Another unintended effect, for the Russian leader who aspired 
to the entry of Ukraine into the Eurasian Union, could be pushing it definitely into the arms 
of the West. If there was a minimum of rationality in what is going on, the goal that the 
Russian President should try to achieve is to prevent the relation between Ukraine and 
Europe, from coming about at the expense of the existing ones with Russia: Ukraine should 
become a factor of approach instead of confrontation between East and West. But this would 
imply that also Europe and the United States should aim for the same goal, which would 
require correction of the policies followed hitherto. 
3.3. Responsability of all parts involved 
Granting a greater autonomy to the regions could be an important step. Internationally, in 
economic terms, arriving at the conclusion of the association agreement and free trade 
agreement with the European Union is inevitable, but an agreement must be accompanied by 
serious guarantees on the path of reforms that the country will have to make in order to get 
closer to the European standards. However, at the same time, there must be a solution that 
ensures also adequate protection of the economic and commercial interests of Russia. On the 
political and geopolitical scale, any possibility of NATO membership is definitely excluded, 
but it is also necessary that the country will become neutral.  
4. HORIZON 2020 PROGRAMME SECTION “SECURE SOCIETIES - 
PROTECTING FREEDOM AND SECURITY OF EUROPE AND ITS CITIZENS” 
The Union’s funding helped to create and spread excellence across Europe, through the 7th 
Framework Programme and the Cohesion Policy funds, through the activities “Regions of 
Knowledge” and “Research Potential” of FP7 "Capacities" programme. Horizon 2020 is the 
financial instrument implementing the Innovation Union, a Europe 2020 flagship initiative 
aimed at Securing Europe's global competitiveness. The international cooperation in Horizon 
2020 will be composed of cooperation with three major groups of countries: 
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 Countries with industrialized and emerging economies;  
 Countries interested in the enlargement and in the proximity policy; 
 Developing countries.  
In particular, the Horizon 2020 programme section “Secure societies - Protecting freedom 
and security of Europe and its citizens” is designed to improve border security, starting with 
better protection of the maritime borders of security of the logistical chain and to support the 
Union's external security policies through conflict prevention and peace-building. In addition, 
the solutions will be developed to support the Union's external security policies in civilian 
tasks, ranging from civil protection to humanitarian aid, border management or peacekeeping 
and post-crisis stabilization, including conflict prevention, peace-building, and mediation. 
The Secure Societies Challenge will contribute to the implementation of the policy goals of 
the Europe 2020 strategy. 
4.1 Security 
The specific objective of this area is to promote secure European societies in a context of 
unprecedented transformations and growing global interdependencies and threats, while 
enhancing European culture of freedom and justice. The threat of large-scale military 
aggression is reduced and security concerns are focused on new multiple interconnected and 
transnational threats. Issues such as human rights, environmental degradation, political 
stability and democracy, social issues, cultural and religious or migration identity should be 
taken into consideration. In this context, the internal and external aspects of security are 
inextricably linked. In order to protect freedom and security, the EU calls for effective 
responses by using a comprehensive and innovative suite of security tools. Thus, research and 
innovation can and must play a clear role of support, aiming to understand, detect, prevent, 
and deter security threats. 
The focus of the activities is to: strengthen security through border management; increase 
Europe's resilience to crises; support the Union's external security policies, including conflict 
prevention and peace-building. 
4.2 The EU as a security zone 
In Europe, people can live in relative national security thanks to police authorities and the 
relevant judicial authority.  
Nevertheless, the European Union is increasing the cooperation and coordination between 
the Member States in order to create a global approach against possible security threats. This 
includes better cross-border cooperation between authorities of the Member States and 
supervisory authorities, particularly in the form of information exchange. The EU Internal 
Security Strategy forms the basis for EU Member States’ cooperation in the field of security-
related issues and it consists of 41 actions that aim to monitor the most urgent security 
threats. 
4.3 European Border Guard Teams 
The new Frontex Regulation, which entered into force in December 2011, specifies that 
Frontex will create European border guard teams (EBGT) for the distribution in joined 
operations at the border. The EBGT will consist of border guards of EU Member States, 
experts in different fields of border management, including surveillance of land and maritime 
borders. Member States shall contribute to the creation of this pool of experts according to 
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specific profiles developed by Frontex. After the selection process, Frontex will provide 
training to the members of the teams interested in their field of expertise and performed tasks. 
All members of the EGBT will receive training in both common European security and in 
international law, including fundamental rights and access to international protection.  
5. PECULIARITIES OF THE RUSSIAN BORDER REGIONS 
Border regions have border-related problems compared to the inner regions, but there are also 
some differences between the border regions that have to face different challenges. First of 
all, the "new" frontier regions suffer from the decline in cross-border economic relations. In 
fact, the centralized economy of the USSR developed the economy of each region as part of a 
production chain, so they were highly complementary and interdependent. Therefore, the 
introduction of standards of border and customs duties caused a rupture of the economic ties 
and major economic difficulties in border regions.  
Curiously, even now the borderlands constitute a significant share of Russia's foreign trade 
with neighbouring countries. Among the four regions of lead in terms of trade with Ukraine, 
the two border regions, Belgorod, and Rostov, indicate nearly 8% and 5% of the Russian 
turnover with Ukraine; the other two are Tyumen (about 13%) and Moscow (about 34%). 
The first holds deposits of oil and gas, it represents the main source of Ukrainian import from 
Russia. If the revenue per capita of the regions is considered with Ukraine, Belgorod Oblast 
will have the biggest indicator. The bottom-up approach is very strong especially in relation 
to Russia's borders with Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. The factors that contribute to it 
are the mix of the population in the border regions, the fact that these countries constituted 
the core of the single State for a long time (the USSR) and that administrative boundaries 
between them were devoid of any particular significance. There has never been a border 
between Russia and some former Soviet republics (Belarus, Ukraine, etc.). Nowadays, these 
countries have common cultural heritage. According to recent research, only 39.1% of 
Ukrainians speak only Ukrainian, 36% only Russian, while 24.8 % speak both languages 
depending on the circumstances. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
Putin’s strategy resembles that used in the Georgian enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia 
during the conflict with Georgia in 2008. Moscow claims a right of interference in the 
territories inhabited by Russian minorities, but doing so directly affects the internal 
equilibriums of sovereign States. 
There are two main reasons why the Russian leader took such significant risks in 
managing the crisis in Ukraine: the weight of history, which considers Kiev as an integral 
part of Russian identity in cultural and religious terms and the fear of a contagion that could 
reignite internal dissent to the Russian Federation itself, so far found only occasionally. 
Therefore, the future of a neighbouring State that has always had close ties with Moscow is 
not the only one at stake, but probably also the maintenance of Putin’s regime, at least in the 
medium term.  
Crimea, as shown, has a troubled history and what happened was predictable; yet, the port 
of Sevastopol, as strategically important for the Russian fleet, isn’t certainly irreplaceable 
given the broad access to the Black Sea which Russia has. However, the most serious 
problem that the Ukrainian situation arises in the Kremlin remains of a political nature. 
Suffice it to say that other than the populations of Russian ethnicity and Ukrainians there is 
even a minority of Tatars who are Muslims that live in Crimea. This creates a direct link 
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between the recent events and the structure of the Russian State, threatened especially by a 
lack of economic dynamism, concealed social discontent and ethnic, linguistic and religious 
fragmentation of numerous peripheries.  
During the economic crisis, Ukraine turned to Russia when the conditions that were 
established by the West in order to grant aid seemed unacceptable to Yanukovych. However, 
one might wonder in case of a substantial fall of the world prices of oil and gas who Moscow 
could ever turn to. Basically, the iron fist of Putin could hide the fragility of his "country 
system". 
Either way, the internal Ukrainian dynamics will be crucial, since not even the Russian 
military force would be sufficient to control the whole country, as its diplomatic pressure 
wasn’t able to keep Yanukovych in office. To avoid a war of secession, Moscow will have to 
compromise on the protection of ethnic-linguist minorities, and to restore the full sovereignty 
of the Ukrainian State. In fact, its latest statements are in accordance. But what is really 
necessary is a government in Kiev which would be willing to include and reassure those 
minorities, rather than exclude, punish and attack them militarily. 
Beyond the internal factors, it is imperative for the USA and Europe to make difficult, 
serious and above all coherent decisions.  
As usual in front of popular uprisings or civil wars, Obama continues to hold a line, an 
expression of maximum prudence according to some, and of weakness according to others. It 
is still not clear at what concrete price he is willing to make Putin pay for a possible 
escalation in Ukraine; but, this vagueness and confusion concerns his foreign policy in 
general, as evidenced by Syria’s and Iran’s issues. 
A glance upon the EU would clarify that neither Brussels nor the individual States have 
the practical ability to provide an economic support that would supply the required amount 
and with such a readiness that would affect the current events. This has always been the 
dilemma of the Community's position on the Ukrainian matter; the EU recognizes the 
importance of the country, but it is also aware of the limits of its own action, whether for the 
size of the State, for the complex relations with Russia, or for the lack of a single voice, a 
coherent and common position. 
Each of Russia, the EU and the U.S.A. has been caught by surprise by the escalation of the 
situation in Ukraine, but unlike Putin, the last two have reacted late and in a non-articulated 
manner. The end of Yanucovich’s regime does not erase the geopolitical problems of 
Ukraine, which must be taken into consideration in order to develop any kind of strategy to 
resolve the current crisis. Supposing they are capable of doing so. 
The EU and the U.S.A. are in doubt about the best course to follow; this is shown by the 
curious "agreement" signed in Geneva on April 17 by the representatives of the EU, Russian, 
American governments and the Ukrainian government ad interim. It essentially provides an 
overall de-escalation, monitored by international observers under the mandate of the OSCE. 
The agreement was immediately and completely ignored by the parties in Ukraine, and it 
seemed a “pretence” from the outset. However, it has shown the despair of diplomacy to what 
actually is happening on the ground. There is no doubt that, for many Russians, the speed and 
superficiality were interpreted as a sign of Western weakness, given also that in the following 
days the schedule of sanctions had stopped (remaining limited to little more than symbolic 
levels) and only recently further steps were taken to hit the Russian economic interests, but 
always in a very selective and targeted manner. The major tangible cost that Moscow has 
paid is the one imposed by international markets, quick to give even summary evaluations on 
the current trend, but also fickle and therefore often unreliable as a thermometer of global 
strategic relations. 
At the moment, the gradual disintegration of Ukraine appears to be a plausible scenario, 
which most likely would pass for a civil war, de facto already taking place. Its regional 
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consequences would be difficult to predict, if not even catastrophic. The future of Russia 
itself is at stake, which is likely to become more aggressive on the outside but at the same 
time more insecure and fragile on the inside. So far, the uncertainty regarding the real 
contours of Russian ambitions caused a strategic weakness of will from the western part; 
however, this does not mean that the weakness will last forever or that this is a part of Putin’s 
strategy. 
The Ukrainian society is a decisive and underrated factor since the beginning of the crisis; 
the political system is dysfunctional and the factions that have alternated in power have 
depleted and depressed the country, promoting even the emergence of some radical 
movements. Meanwhile, those leaderships have never accepted the principle of a national 
reconciliation that could gradually give life to a true sense of the State even between the 
consistent Russian and Russian-speaking minorities, who are a majority in some regions.  
This is the basic problem that today does not allow the authorities of Kiev to control its 
territory and to exercise at least a real political soft power, even beyond the objective balance 
of power that certainly encourages Russia militarily. It must not be forgotten that it was the 
underestimation of the internal factor - "the square" – that surprised both Putin and the West 
in the days of the escape of then-President Yanukovych. A portion of responsibility for the 
future of the country is still in the hands of the Ukrainian leadership, now forced to consider 
the possibility of a "federalization" of the State in the attempt of preventing the 
disintegration, but it could become a halved sovereignty against Russian power. Either way, 
the internal framework is probably too composite to allow neutralization of the country. Such 
a solution would make the Ukrainian people an object, not an active subject of international 
negotiations, and this is probably impossible regardless of whether it is desirable or not. 
For this reason, many have spoken of a new "Cold War", which central dynamics was the 
strategic calculation of the "worst case scenario" in every possible situation, in the overall 
perspective of an all-out competition between the two blocks, which then urged both parties 
to use the military and economic power for deterrence. The constant deterrence required a 
certain degree of operational readiness and of arms race that otherwise would not have been 
justified. Each move had to have a response, the chain reaction was often inevitable, and 
building relationships of trust was the rare exception rather than the rule.  
Many assert that the absence of an ideological incentive by the current Russia makes a 
clash of that magnitude impossible, but it must not be forgotten that ideologies are created too 
quickly, with a mix of consensus-building and internal repression that can quickly change a 
society. 
It should be emphasized that even the common economic interests, which clearly everyone 
is trying to defend, end up in the background when the overall calculation of costs and 
benefits changes. History teaches that taking for granted the composition of a serious dispute 
using only the tools of economic interdependence is a mistake. 
The current trajectory of fragmentation of Ukraine is a disaster which can still be 
remedied, if the future scenarios that might occur are thought through. 
So far, the fear of an uncontrolled escalation, both in the territory of Ukraine and in the 
bilateral relationship with Russia, has almost paralyzed the Western reaction. However, if 
Moscow will take the road of a systematic assertion of its imperial right, the West, according 
to analysts, could make use of its full power for deterrence and enforcement. 
The reality is that Putin considers keeping Ukraine in the Russian sphere of influence a 
vital national interest and that he is willing to take big risks. Moreover, it seems highly 
probable that he does not take the threat of Obama seriously, after attending to the hesitation 
of the American President on Syria. 
A military response of NATO is unthinkable, as well as the western attempt to isolate 
Russia in the international community, of which it is an active member. Finally, the West 
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would need to demonstrate to Ukrainians that it would support the new government and that 
it can offer a path to prosperity, instead of Russia. 
Russia is not the old Soviet Union, which was relatively impervious to diplomatic and 
economic censorship. Putin knows that Russia could pay a high price for what he is doing in 
Ukraine. For now, he believes that the risk is worth taking because, in his eyes, the West is 
supine, decadent, and more concerned about maintaining Russian oil and gas exports than 
keeping a firm stand for the idea of a united, free and secure Europe. The problem with 
"Ukraine" is no longer about the Independence Square in Kiev, democracy in Ukraine or 
European integration. This is about how to maintain a vision of Europe - and, indeed, of the 
world - in which countries give the idea that the peoples are the only ones that are worth 
protecting. 
The solution of a negotiation on a new federal structure of Ukraine with certain guarantees 
for the Russian-speaking minority is surely a minimum requirement but perhaps not enough. 
A commitment for not joining NATO or the EU might be required. Those who report similar 
assumptions as limitations on the sovereignty of Ukraine do not fully evaluate the gravity of 
the alternatives. Proclaiming the right of Ukraine to choose its economic and military 
alliances certainly is not politically correct, but it is not a responsible strategy if it involves 
the risk of a split of the country and a new Cold War. 
Moscow certainly has a major responsibility in this crisis, at least for instigating 
insurrectionary actions in eastern Ukraine. The reports of international observers along with 
the Ukrainian secret service should clarify to which extent Russian agents have participated 
in those actions. However, it would be wrong as well as naive to attribute the state of 
agitation in Donetsk, Lugansk, Sloviansk and in other cities in the East even including 
Odessa solely to external interference; the same would be to say that Majdan was an 
operation of the western service. 
The animosity that divides Russians and Ukrainians in the East as in the West of the 
country is underestimated by many foreigners. In 2014, the risk isn’t to slip into a generalised 
military conflict but to an economic war and a new cold war, with disastrous consequences 
for European economies and for Ukraine itself, even if it was spared from a real civil war. It 
is a risk that some Western politicians seem willing to take, believing that Moscow is to 
blame. 
Probably the Russian action in Crimea, a logical consequence of the coup d’état favoured 
by the West in Kiev, was just another one of Putin’s moves to get him to deal with the United 
States and the European Union from a position of strength. The agreement reached in Geneva 
was just a farce. Now a new phase is opening in which Russia will have to decide whether to 
accept the minor role assigned to it by the West as a regional power or to revive its traditional 
geopolitical aspiration to become again a great power in alliance with the BRICS countries.  
It is also clear that the strategic and synergistic Russian-European economic relations have 
been cracked by the Russian-Ukrainian crisis, exactly how the United States wanted. 
However, it is obvious that major economic and political forces, especially in Germany, are 
pushing for a swift reconciliation with the Russian Federation. 
As predicted by President Putin, it is Italy’s turn to play a crucial diplomatic role to put 
Russia and the EU in contact with each other, since it will lead the next Presidency of the 
European Union. 
The final Portrait of the EU to the Ukrainian crisis highlights several very complex 
problems with which it must deal. The EU is not a geopolitical entity; it has less weight than 
the sum of its member states and even less than many of them considered singularly. On one 
hand, when it comes to military interventions the only weapon it possesses is the rhetoric; on 
the other, when it comes to real weapons the only remaining option is to invoke the 
protection of the U.S.A. In addition, the evaluations and perceptions of Russia and Putin are 
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different, if not opposite, depending on the distance and on relations also the sympathy for 
the U.S.A. and for its policy is related to the fear of Russia. After all, the political and 
strategic dependence on the U.S.A. determines that punishing Russia, EU will be punishing 
itself, given the vital economic relations with Moscow. 
That is true, but ultimately the problem is a political one: The EU seems unable to protect 
itself and its borders and to ensure peace and security, despite the policies adopted and in 
spite of the Horizon 2020 programme. 
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